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The overbreadth doctrine' is a mainstay of free speech jurisprudence, yet
few historians have investigated its origins.2 Most commentators3 assert that
the doctrine originated in the Supreme Court's landmark 1940 picketing
decision in Thornhill v. Alabama.4 But these scholars have overlooked the
labor injunction cases that preceded Thornhill.5 That line of cases, commonly
considered to be hostile to labor,6 ironically gave rise to what would become
one of labor's most significant doctrinal protections.
7
1. Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, courts analyze whether a statute potentially
restricts protected speech, regardless of the constitutional status of a particular defendant's conduct.
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1124-28 (2d ed. 1991); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1-2; Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 844, 845 (1970). Under current doctrine, a litigant must demonstrate that a statute is "substantially
overbroad" before courts will hold it invalid on its face. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973).
2. Most commentators who have analyzed the overbreadth doctrine have focused on its conceptual
underpinnings rather than its historical origins. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE LJ. 853 (1991); Monaghan, supra note 1. Most free speech historians have focused
on the origins of other doctrines, particularly those developed by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. See, e.g.,
David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modem First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205 (1983)
(tracing development of clear and present danger doctrine by Holmes and Brandeis); G. Edward White,
Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 391, 407-12 (1992) (attributing Justice Holmes's role in transforming free speech jurisprudence to
his personal ideas and relationships).
3. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 2, at 863; Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4
VAND. L. REv. 533, 539 (1951); Monaghan, supra note 1, at 11. Even the Supreme Court has described
Thornhill as the "source" of the overbreadth doctrine. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 798 (1984).
4. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). In Thornhill, the Court invalidated an Alabama picketing statute under the First
Amendment. Id. at 96-98.
5. For a comprehensive history of the labor injunction, see FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCrION (1930).
6. The accounts of the abuse of the labor injunction are numerous. See, e.g., id. at 1, 132-33; CHARLES
0. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 95-104 (2d ed. 1949); SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN
LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 54-55 (1990).
7. The importance for organized labor of Thornhill's overbreadth protection of picketing led Thurgood
Marshall to describe that opinion as "one of the most important decisions of the Supreme Court." Thurgood
Marshall, Mr Justice Murphy and Civil Rights, 48 MICH. L. REv. 745, 748 (1950).
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In labor injunction cases, courts of equity prior to the 1930s often abused
their powers by issuing blanket decrees prohibiting picketing and union
organizing. A minority of appellate courts held, however, that blanket
injunctions were "too broad," 9 relying on traditional maxims of equity0 to
develop a doctrine regarding the proper breadth of labor injunctions. These
courts ruled that a decree was "too broad" if it reached beyond unlawful acts
and swept within its ambit "lawful persuasion"" or "publication"' 2  of
information about a labor dispute. A significant aspect of this analysis was that
courts permitted defendants to challenge the potential breadth of injunctions
that would reach peaceful "persuasion" even if the defendants' own conduct
had been unlawful and properly enjoinable. 3
In the crucible of the Great Depression and New Deal, courts increasingly
began to recognize labor's right to organize as an important free speech
issue,'4 engrafting constitutional analysis onto the extant overbreadth doctrinal
structure in labor injunction cases. 15 As labor decrees became more limited,
and as employers began to rely on equally expansive picketing statutes, 16 state
high courts used the overbreadth approach of equity to invalidate such statutes
8. See WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OFTHE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 62 (1991);
VICTORIA C. HATIrAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER 161 n.124 (1993); WALKER, supra note 6, at
54-55.
9. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers, 200
P. 1, 7 (Cal. 1921); Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 103 P. 324, 328 (Cal. 1909); Goldberg, Bowen & Co.
v. Stablemen's Union, 86 P. 806, 808 (Cal. 1906); Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 62 S.E.
236, 239 (Ga. 1908); Hotel & R.R. News Co. v. Leventhal, 137 N.E. 534, 537 (Mass. 1922); Plant v.
Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (Mass. 1900); Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 159 N.E. 863, 869
(N.Y. 1928); Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 160 N.Y.S. 279, 286 (App. Div. 1916); Mills v. United
States Printing Co., 99 A.D. 605, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904).
10. A traditional maxim that gave rise to the overbreadth doctrine at equity was aequitas sequitur
legem, which means "equity follows the law." For a description of this maxim, see JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 64 (Legal Classics ed. 1988) (London, Stevens & Haynes
1884). Another important maxim was that equity will not restrain in advance activities that have not been
proven likely to occur. See 1 JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 22 (Chicago,
Callaghan & Co. 3d ed. 1890).
11. Plant, 57 N.E. at 1015.
12. Pierce, 103 P. at 328.
13. See, e.g., Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45,49-52 (7th Cir. 1908) (narrowing
broad injunction to protect right of "persuasion" in labor dispute even though defendants had committed
acts of violence); Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' Int'l Union, 193 N.E. 112, 121 (Ill. 1934) ("The mere fact
that acts of violence had been previously committed would of itself furnish no justification for enjoining
legal acts of peaceable persuasion."); Plant, 57 N.E. at 1015 (modifying injunction to protect "lawful
persuasion" even though defendant's strike for closed shop was deemed unlawful). Courts allowed
defendants to challenge the potential scope of injunctions even if defendants' conduct had been unlawful
because "an injunction does not issue.., as punishment for the past." Nann v. Raimist, 174 N.E. 690, 693
(N.Y. 1931).
14. See Joseph Tanenhaus, Picketing as Free Speech: Early Stages in the Growth of the New Law of
Picketing, 14 U. PITT. L. REv. 397, 413 (1953).
15. See, e.g., Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 41 P.2d 314, 316 (Cal. 1935); Ex parte Lyons, 81 P.2d
190, 196-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
16. See Note, Constitutionality of Anti-Picketing Ordinances, 48 YALE L.J. 308, 308-09 (1938)
(explaining that employers increasingly relied on broad picketing ordinances in wake of increasing
unavailability of broad injunctions); Eugene T. Kinder, Comment, 39 MICH. L. REv. 110, 112 (1940).
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under the First Amendment. 7 These opinions served as important precedents
at the time the Court decided Thornhill, and their influence was evident in the
Court's enunciation of the free speech overbreadth doctrine. Drawing from the
approach at equity, the Court in Thornhill held that a picketing statute that was
so broad as to restrict protected speech was unconstitutional, and that the
defendant could challenge such a broad prohibition on its face regardless of
whether his own conduct was not privileged.' s
Part I of this Note traces the emergence of overbreadth analysis in the
regulation of labor at equity, analyzing the rise of broad labor injunctions and
judicial and legislative efforts to restrict them under the traditional principles
of equity. Part II examines the constitutionalization of the overbreadth doctrine
under the First Amendment in injunction cases, in state court statutory cases,
and finally in the landmark case of Thornhill v. Alabama.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS IN THE REGULATION OF
LABOR AT EQUITY
A. The Ascendancy of the Labor Injunction and the Abuse of Equity
The rise of the injunction as the principal tool for regulating labor
catalyzed the development of overbreadth analysis at equity. Prior to the 1880s,
the primary means of regulating labor disputes in the United States had been
criminal prosecution under the common law doctrine of conspiracy. 9 In the
late 1800s, however, the labor injunction supplanted criminal conspiracy
trials,20 largely as a result of employers' responses to changes in labor
organizing tactics.2' The local strike by informal groups of workers gave way
to far-reaching strikes organized by unions that often coordinated activity
across cities, regions, and even the entire nation.22 Employers found that these
new strategies were difficult to combat with conspiracy trials, which moved
slowly and could affect only a limited number of people and range of
activities.2 3 The injunction, which did not require jury trials and could reach
a wider range of people in speedier fashion,24 was a more effective tool for
17. See People v. Harris, 91 P.2d 989 (Colo. 1939); City of Reno v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 95
P.2d 994 (Nev. 1939).
18. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
19. See HATrAM, supra note 8, at 161; Joseph Tanenhaus, Picketing as a Tort: The Development of
the Law of Picketing from 1880 to 1940, 14 U. P'rr. L. REv. 170, 172 (1953); Edwin E. Witte, Early
American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 832 (1925).
20. FORBATH, supra note 8, at 61; HATTAM, supra note 8, at 161; Witte, supra note 19, at 832.
21. For an excellent account of the historical circumstances surrounding the rise of the labor
injunction, see FORBATH, supra note 8, at 63-97.
22. Id. at 61-63, 81-83.
23. HATrAM, supra note 8, at 161.
24. Id.
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controlling the new coordinated strike strategies and hence became employers'
preferred remedy.2
In order to seek injunctive relief, employers had to bring suit at equity
rather than at law. Under traditional conceptions, equity served as a supplement
to the law, providing a remedy in the interests of justice and fairness where no
adequate relief at law was available.26 The typical remedy at equity was the
injunction, or judicial decree, whereas the remedies available at law were
damages or criminal prosecution. In requesting equitable relief, employers
argued that the available legal remedies of damages or prosecution were
inadequate because it would be impracticable to file a multiplicity of actions
to redress a far-reaching labor conspiracy.27
The first equitable decrees against far-flung strikes were issued in railway
labor cases in the late 1870s and 1880s, 2' although the precise date of the
first labor injunction is unknown.29 Courts issued sweeping decrees to crush
the national railroad strike of 187730 and the Pullman Strike of 1894.31
Observing the expansive potential of this new weapon against labor organizing,
employers and manufacturers' associations eagerly sought injunctions in labor
disputes outside the railway context and in smaller-scale disputes as well. 2
Employers faced with strikes or other union activity increasingly went to
judges, at times even judges who were not officially sitting, and alleged by
affidavit that a labor conspiracy would do irreparable damage to their property
unless restrained by court order.3 Judges usually granted requests for broad
preliminary injunctions forbidding union activity and later issued formal
injunctions after bench trials between the parties.3 4
25. Id.; see Clarence E. Bonnett, Jr., The Origin of the Labor Injunction, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 123
(1931).
26. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 47; GREGORY, supra note 6, at 96; GARY L.
McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1982).
27. See EDWIN STACEY OAKES, THE LAW OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS § 543
(1927).
28. FORBATH, supra note 8, at 66-79. See generally Walter Nelles, A Strike and Its Legal
Consequences-An Examination of the Receivership Precedent for the Labor Injunction, 40 YALE LJ. 507
(1931) (arguing that labor injunctions likely originated in 1877 railroad strike in which railroads were in
equitable receivership).
29. Witte, supra note 19, at 832.
30. The decree in this case was an order of the court of equity that held the railroad in receivership.
Although it was not technically an injunction, it was an important precursor for the broad use of equitable
powers to regulate labor. See FORBATH, supra note 8, at 66-68; Nelles, supra note 28, at 533.
3 1. FORBATH, supra note 8. at 73-76.
32. See Bonnett, supra note 25, at 123-24.
33. GREGORY, supra note 6, at 100. Other theories besides "civil conspiracy" included "inducing
breach of contract" and "restraint of trade" under the common law. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Labor and
the Courts, 39 YALE L.J. 682, 686-91 (1930). In federal courts, employers relied largely on the Sherman
Antitrust Act under a theory of conspiracy in restraint of trade. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5,
at 8-9.
34. GREGORY, supra note 6, at 100.
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The scope of these formal injunctions was often expansive with respect to
both the number of people and the types of activities covered.35 The
injunction issued against Eugene Debs and the Pullman railroad strikers in
1894, for example, ordered the defendants "and all persons combining and
conspiring with them, and all other persons whomsoever, absolutely to
desist ... from... in any way or manner interfering with... the business of
any of the following named railroads. 36 Such a broad injunction put a large
number of people at risk of contempt of court for engaging in peaceful efforts
to persuade other workers to desist from work. In describing the problem of
broad injunctions in 1915, Edwin Witte, a prominent contemporary
commentator,37 reported that "blanket clauses prohibiting interference in any
manner with the business or property of complainants have occurred in
probably more than one-half of all injunctions which have been issued in
connection with labor disputes. 38 The broad reach of labor injunctions gave
rise to the slogan "government by injunction, 39 which reflected the growing
discontent with the unbounded power of the equity courts in labor disputes.
In issuing these injunctions, courts abused the traditional principles of
equity that customarily had limited the scope of injunctive powers.40 One of
the central principles that the labor injunction courts overlooked was the tenet
that equity courts should tailor their decrees to the substantive law on the
matter at hand.4 ' This principle is embodied in the maxim, aequitas sequitur
legem, which means "equity follows the law."42 Courts ignored this maxim
35. HATTAM, supra note 8, at 161 & n.124.
36. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 570 (1895) (Record on Appeal).
37. Tanenhaus, supra note 19, at 197.
38. Edwin E. Witte, Industrial Comm., app. B at 155 (1915), quoted in FRANKFURTER & GREENE,
supra note 5, at 99 n.82.
39. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 1.
40. See FORBATH, supra note 8, at 62 ("Courts cast aside customary limits on the purpose and scope
of injunctions to accommodate the injunction's new role as a mode of lawmaking and law enforcement in
industrial cities and regions."); GREGORY, supra note 6, at 98 ("And they completely ignored the policy
behind the traditions of equity, which left people free from personal interference at the hands of the court,
except in very special cases of unreasonably precipitated threatened harm to tangible property.").
By asserting jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes, courts generally contravened the
principle of nineteenth-century doctrine that equity may only intervene to protect against damage to tangible
property. See FORBATH, supra note 8, at 81-82, 85. By treating an employer's expectation of the continued
services of his employees as property, Witte, supra note 19, at 834, the courts relied on a rather expansive
definition of property that conflicted with the prevailing view of nineteenth-century equity jurisprudence
that property consisted of dominion over objects, see FORBATH, supra note 8, at 81, 85. The courts' abstract
definition of property in injunction cases gained greater legitimacy, however, in the decades following the
first uses of the labor injunction as the rise of laissez-faire economics expanded the concept of property
to include "the right to do business and [maintain] established relationships." Witte, supra note 19, at 836.
See generally MORTON J. HoRwrrT THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 146-51
(1992) (explaining expanded concept of property in late 1800s).
41. GREGORY, supra note 6, at 102-03.
42. See MCDOWELL, supra note 26, at 5, 76-77; STORY, supra note 10, § 64; Roscoe Pound, On
Certain Maxims of Equity, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYS 259, 270 (1926).
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when they issued blanket decrees without heed to the substantive law of labor
conspiracies, which contained modest protections for labor activity.43
Courts in labor injunction cases contravened, moreover, the traditional
principle of equity that courts may only issue a decree to prevent irreparable
injury that has been clearly proven likely to occur." Courts violated this
requirement by issuing injunctions against a wide range of actions that had not
been pleaded or proven likely to transpire. In addition, by issuing decrees
against virtually all the world, the courts violated the principle that equity
should not interfere with the rights of innocent parties or third parties not privy
to the suit.45
B. The Emergence of a Doctrine Against Broad Labor Injunctions
As blanket injunctions proliferated, some of the more prudent state
appellate courts46 began to hand down decisions criticizing the broad scope
of labor injunctions under the traditional principles of equity jurisprudence.
One of the central maxims that undergirded these decisions was aequitas
sequitur legem, which prompted some appeals courts to limit lower court
injunctions to the ambit warranted by the common law of labor conspiracy.47
Since the 1840s, the common law in the United States had held that labor
organizing did not constitute unlawful conspiracy if both the means and the
ends of the activity were legitimate.a Over time, courts had developed
43. See Witte, supra note 19, at 828 (explaining that, under conspiracy doctrine, legality of labor
combination depended on purposes sought to be accomplished and means used to effect that purpose); infra
text accompanying notes 48-53.
44. See 1 HIGH, supra note 10, § 22.
45. See id. § 33 ("So an injunction does not affect the rights of third parties which have been acquired
in good faith when they are not parties or privies to the suit."); see also GREGORY, supra note 6, at 101
("Anyone violating the broad and comprehensive terms of such injunctions was punished for contempt,
whether or not he had been served as.a party in the suit.").
46. See GREGORY, supra note 6, at 103 ("A few of the highest state courts ... were also careful in
the way they used their power to issue injunctions whenever they exercised it.").
47. See, e.g., Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 103 P. 324, 328-29 (Cal. 1909); Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E.
1011, 1015 (Mass. 1900); Mills v. United States Printing Co., 99 A.D. 605, 608-9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904).
48. Archibald Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 767,
774-75 (1950); Witte, supra note 19, at 828. The doctrine of lawful means and ends was first clearly
articulated in the 1842 conspiracy case of Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842) cited in
Witte, supra note 19, at 828. This doctrine was preserved in labor conspiracy cases during the era of the
injunction, see Witte, supra note 19, at 828, and was even applied in cases involving other theories for
injunctive relief, such as restraint of trade. See Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence:
The Regulation of Picketing and Boycotts, 1894-1921, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1988/89). The doctrine
of lawful means and ends was restated in slightly different form in the 1890s by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., in his influential essay Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3 (1894) and in his judicial
dissent in the Massachusetts labor case of Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080-81 (Mass. 1896)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes argued that the intentional infliction of economic damage by a union in
a labor dispute could escape liability under the common law if accompanied by lawful justification. See
id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). According to Holmes, such justification depended on whether the ends and
means of the labor activity were legitimate in light of public policy concerns. See Plant, 57 N.E. at 1016
(Holmes, C.J., dissenting); Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1080-81 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also FRANKFURTER
& GREENE, supra note 5, at 24-25 (explaining Holmes's theory).
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criteria for identifying legitimate or "justifiable" means and ends. The means
of labor activity were deemed legitimate if they fell within relatively narrow
constraints of socially acceptable behavior and did not pose a threat of physical
injury or undue economic harm.49 Courts characteristically distinguished, for
example, between legitimate "persuasion" and unacceptable "intimidation."50
This distinction was malleable,5' leading to varying levels of protection for
picketing and organizing in different jurisdictions. 52 As for labor's ends,
courts found them to be legitimate if they fell within the immediate range of
workers' economic self-interest and did not interfere with an employer's
freedom of contract.
5 3
In following the law, a small number of equity courts at the turn of the
century, particularly state appellate courts54  of California,
55
Massachusetts,56 and New York,57 began to hold that injunctions were "too
broad" if they prohibited labor activity with legitimate means and ends.58
Although these decisions varied in their degree of substantive protection,59
with some providing only nominal protection,6 they were significant because
they established an overbreadth form of analysis. A notable example of the
emerging overbreadth doctrine was the opinion of the California Supreme
Court in Pierce v. Stablemen's Union,61 handed down in 1909. The court held
that a labor injunction that restrained members of a union from "'in any wise
interfering with' plaintiff's business" was "broader in its terms than the law
warrants., 62 The court explained that the injunction was "too broad" because
it reached "reasonable persuasion," "publication," and "secondary boycott[s],"
which were "legal" means for achieving the union's objectives.63 The court
49. Avery, supra note 48, at 38.
50. See Jerome R. Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts, 10 N.C. L. REv. 158, 175 (1932).
51. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 34-35.
52. Id. at 30-31.
53. Avery, supra note 48, at 38.
54. See GREGORY, supra note 6, at 103 ("A few of the highest state courts consistently held fairly
liberal views concerning the lawful ambit of union conduct.").
55. See Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 103 P. 325, 329 (Cal. 1909); Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v.
Stablemen's Union, 86 P. 806, 808 (Cal. 1906).
56. See Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (Mass. 1900).
57. See Mills v. United States Printing Co., 99 A.D. 605, 608-09 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904).
58. Some appellate courts in other jurisdictions used a similar overbreadth approach. See, e.g., Jones
v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 62 S.E. 236, 239 (Ga. 1908) ("The form of the injunction is
perhaps too broad, in that the strikers are enjoined from using all form of persuasion."); Gray v. Building
Trades Council, 97 N.W. 663, 667-68 (Minn. 1903) (holding that injunction is too broad because part of
it "goes beyond the limits of the law").
59. See FRANKFUKRER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 30-31.
60. See, e.g., Plant, 57 N.E. at 1015.
61. 103 P. 325 (Cal. 1909). A similar overbreadth decision was rendered in Goldberg, Bowen, & Co.
v. Stablemen's Union, 86 P. 806, 808 (Cal. 1906) (finding an injunction to be "too comprehensive" because
some parts "seem to enjoin appellants from the mere expression of an opinion").
62. Pierce, 103 P. at 328.
63. Id. at 328-29. The court's analysis was characteristic of some of the early overbreadth decisions
because the court focused on protecting means of communication that the union might use, such as
"persuasion" and "publication," without explicitly linking those means to a range of possible ends that
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did not, however, protect picketing, which it found to be an unlawful
means.64 Thus, the court applied overbreadth analysis to tailor the decree to
the scope warranted by the substantive law.
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Plant v.
Woods65 held that a lower court decree restraining a decorators' union from
striking for a closed shop was "too broad and indefinite, inasmuch as it might
seem to include mere lawful persuasion and other similar and peaceful
acts., 66 Thus, the court found the injunction to be overly broad because it
might cover lawful labor activity. In Mills v. United States Printing Co.,67
moreover, a New York court held that an injunction against picketing and
organizing a strike was drafted "in terms too broad" because it would forbid
efforts to organize a strike to seek better working conditions, which was an
instance of lawful activity undertaken for a lawful purpose.6 8 Thus, these
courts found injunctions to be "too broad" because they prohibited legitimate
organizing activity without regard for the substantive law of labor disputes.
In addition, the emerging doctrine against broad injunctions was not
predicated exclusively on the notion that equity should follow the substantive
law. Concern for traditional principles of equity also led some courts to refuse
to prohibit offenses that had not been proven likely to come about. In 1907,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reasoned, for example, that
unlawful conduct that had not been "pleaded and proved" could not properly
be enjoined with a blanket injunction against "any interference in the future"
with the plaintiff's business. 9 Courts also found some injunctions to be too
expansive because they violated the principle that equity should not enjoin the
conduct of innocent parties; in these cases, courts modified broad injunctions
to protect the rights of parties who had not engaged in unlawful conduct.
70
A salient aspect of the emerging overbreadth jurisprudence was that courts
allowed parties to challenge the prospective scope of injunctions even if their
would be permissible. Perhaps due to a reluctance to legitimize a variety of ends of union organizing, the
court simply implied that the means it was protecting would be used for lawful ends.
64. Id. at 328.
65. 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900).
66. Id. at 1015. The court in Plant, like the court in Pierce, applied overbreadth analysis to protect
future legitimate acts of persuasion while only implicitly linking them to a possible range of ends. Id.
67. 99 A.D. 605 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904).
68. Id. at 608-09.
69. Aberthaw Constr. Co. v. Cameron, 80 N.E. 478, 479 (Mass. 1907); see also Goyette v. C.V.
Watson Co., 140 N.E. 285, 291 (Mass. 1923) (finding that decree was "too broad in scope" and should be
modified by expressly limiting it to conduct as alleged in bill); Hotel & R.R. News Co. v. Leventhal, 137
N.E. 534, 537 (Mass. 1922) ("The decree however is too sweeping. The defendants are not shown to have
threatened to inaugurate a strike....").
70. See Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 F. 148, 151 (N.D. Ohio 1906) ("[I]t would be a gross
injustice to attach to persons who have not been shown to be participants in these transactions the stigma
of an injunction."); FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 124 n.163 (citing cases for which
"[i]njunctions have been dissolved as to innocent parties defendant").
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own conduct had been unlawful. 71 Regardless of whether the party
challenging an injunction had engaged in unlawful conduct such as
intimidation or even violence, the courts eliminated portions of injunctions that
could conceivably restrict efforts at peaceful persuasion by that party or
unnamed parties in the future. 2 This jurisprudence stemmed from equity's
concern for restricting the prospective impact of injunctions on the rights of
the parties before the court as well as on third parties. I shall argue that this
strain of jurisprudence later influenced the Supreme Court in creating the free
speech overbreadth exception to the constitutional standing rule that parties
whose own conduct is not privileged may not vindicate prospective violations
of rights not currently before the court.73
The analytic framework of the emerging overbreadth doctrine was
important not only for its eventual theoretical implications for free speech
jurisprudence, but also for its practical effect. The practice of striking
provisions that prohibited peaceful persuasion while upholding the power of
lower courts to regulate "illegitimate" means and ends allowed courts to
achieve a pragmatic balance between freedom and regulation.74 Courts found
this balance to be useful for stabilizing volatile labor conflicts because it
created a safety valve of expression while preserving the power of courts to
ban tactics they viewed as more threatening.75 This balance would assume
even greater importance in the tumultuous 1930s.
C. The Clayton Act and Its Aftermath
Most courts in the early 1900s, however, did not adopt the emerging
doctrine against broad injunctions, 76 which remained largely confined to a
71. See, e.g., Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45,49 (7th Cir. 1908) ("(S]urely men
are not to be denied the right to pursue a legitimate end in a legitimate way, simply because they may have
overstepped the mark and trespassed upon the rights of their adversary."). Courts that adopted the
overbreadth doctrine generally permitted defendants to challenge the overly broad portions of injunctions
even if most of their own conduct was unlawful. See, e.g., Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen's Union,
86 P. 806, 808 (Cal. 1906); Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (Mass. 1900).
72. See, e.g., Iron Molders' Union, 166 F. at 48, 52.
73. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) ("Embedded in the traditional rules
governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally
be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court."); see also STONE ET AL., supra note
1, at 1124.
74. See HATrAM, supra note 8, at 162 (explaining that courts used labor injunctions to find a "middle
ground" or pragmatic balance allowing labor organization to be both accepted and regulated).
75. See Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 263 F. 171, 189 (N.D. Ohio 1919) ("[Picketing]
was ordered and allowed in this case as a convenient means of stabilizing a very uncertain situation.").
76. See Witte, supra note 38, app. B at 155 (estimating that blanket clauses were issued in more than
half of all injunction cases before 1915). It is difficult to specify the exact number of cases that issued
blanket injunctions since many such injunctions were unreported, see FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note
5, at 91 n.40, but most sources indicate that a majority of courts abused their equity power, see, e.g.,
GREGORY, supra note 6, at 103-04. In addition, the task of specifying the exact scope of the problem is
difficult because the leading authorities on injunctions were not impartial or above the fray with regard to
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minority of state appellate courts. 7' The problem of broad injunctions was
particularly serious in the federal courts, which were typically the most hostile
to labor.78 In response to the repeated abuse of equity by federal courts, the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) began to lobby for legislation to curb the
power of federal equity courts in labor disputes. 79 After years of AFL
lobbying, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914.0
The key provision of the statute from labor's standpoint was § 20, which
restricted the scope of injunctions in disputes between "employers and
employees."8' Section 20 limited injunctions by requiring federal courts to
follow the traditional principle of equity that an injunction shall not be granted
unless "necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property," and by insisting
that the property right be described "with particularity. 82 Congress thereby
sought to cure the problem of broadly phrased injunctions that were issued in
the absence of proof of actual or highly probable harm. Section 20 also
forbade courts to enjoin workers from "peacefully persuading" and
"communicating information," and protected labor's right of "peaceably
assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes. 8 3 The Act was
described by one of its leading proponents, John W. Davis, as an "effort to
crystallize into law the best opinions of the best courts. '8 4 Although this
statement was motivated by salesmanship, it did embody an important element
of truth. As we have seen, some courts had protected "peaceful persuasion"
and had limited injunctions by requiring proof of an actual threat of harm
under a nascent overbreadth doctrine at equity. Thus, the Clayton, Act
represented the first instance in which Congress exerted pressure on the federal
courts to adopt the emerging equitable overbreadth doctrine of labor injunction
cases.
Interestingly, the debate surrounding the Clayton Act foreshadowed the
link between the overbreadth doctrine at equity and constitutional principles
that would become central in the 1930s. Samuel Gompers, President of the
AFL, hailed the Act as labor's "Magna Carta, ''85 and some of its proponents
this socially charged issue. The treatise by Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene on the labor injunction,
which remains the classic work on the subject, HATrAM, supra note 8, at 161 n.123, was written largely
to contribute to the lobbying effort for passage of anti-injunction legislation. See WALKER, supra note 6,
at 87.
77. See GREGORY, supra note 6, at 103 (explaining that a few state high courts were careful in issuing
injunctions).
78. Id. at 103-04; see FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 96.
79. See FORBATH, supra note 8, at 154-56; GREGORY, supra note 6, at 104.
80. Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 212, 33 Stat. 730 (1914).
81. Id. § 20.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 48 CONG. REC. 6438 (1912) (statement of Rep. Davis), quoted in FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra
note 5, at 160.
85. Samuel Gompers, The Charter of Industrial Freedom, 21 AM. FEDERATIONIST 971, 972 (1914),
quoted in FORBATH, supra note 8, at 157.
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touted it as a bill of rights for labor in equitable proceedings.86 This
propensity to characterize a law codifying labor's rights at equity as possessing
the majesty of the Magna Carta illustrates the conceptual roots of the later
constitutionalization of the overbreadth doctrine of equity.
Despite labor's hopes for a new Magna Carta and the sincere efforts of
Congress to limit injunctions to the best principles of equity, the federal courts
remained recalcitrant.87 The United States Supreme Court, in its first
pronouncement upon the Clayton Act, declared that § 20 did not protect union
members who were peacefully persuading employees of other companies not
to work with machines built by their company.88 The Court, relying on a
narrow reading of the Act, reasoned that § 20 was inapplicable because a
secondary boycott was not within the statutory definition of a dispute between
employers and employees. With the Supreme Court's guidance, lower courts
continued to issue broad injunctions against interference with business.8 9
It is important to point out, however, that in the wake of the Clayton Act
some courts did take the principles of equity more seriously.90 Most of these
tribunals were state courts, which technically were not bound by the federal
Clayton Act.9' Nevertheless, they continued to apply the principles of equity
and to develop the overbreadth doctrine.92 In Grassi Contracting Co. v.
Bennett, for example, a New York court found that an injunction forbidding
any type of strike was "altogether too broad" because it was "warranted neither
by the facts nor the law."93 The court reasoned that the injunction was too
broad because it prohibited publishing "in any manner" that the plaintiff's
business was being blacklisted and forbade the defendant from calling a strike
86. See Note, The Labor Provisions of the Clayton Act, 30 HARv. L. REv. 632, 632 (1917).
87. Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930,66 TEx. L. REv. 919,964
(1988).
88. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
89. See, e.g., Kinloch Tel. Co. v. Local Union No. 2, 275 F. 241 (8th Cir. 1921); Quinlivan v. Dail-
Overland Co., 274 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1921); Buyer v. Guillan 271 F. 65 (2d Cir. 1921); Charleston Dry Dock
& Mach. Co. v. O'Rourke, 274 F. 811 (E.D.S.C. 1921).
90. See, e.g., Gasaway v. Borderland Coal Corp., 278 F. 56, 63 (7th Cir. 1921) ("But no injunction,
preliminary or final, should forbid more than the particular unlawful invasions which the court finds would
be committed except for the restraint imposed."); Great N. Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414,420 (D.N.D. 1923)
(criticizing ways other courts misapplied Clayton Act and seeking to apply it correctly).
91. Some state legislatures also passed anti-injunction legislation, but these statutes were often
invalidated or effectively nullified by parsimonious judicial construction. See FORBATH, supra note 8, at
150.
92. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers,
200 P. 1, 7 (Cal. 1921); International Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, 148 A. 826, 831 (Md. 1930);
Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 159 N.E. 863, 869 (N.Y. 1928); Grassi Contracting Co. v.
Bennett, 160 N.Y.S. 279, 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916).
93. 160 N.Y.S. at 286. For other examples of courts holding injunctions to be too broad for reaching
lawful activity, see Gasaway v. Borderland Coal Corp., 278 F. 56, 64-65 (7th Cir. 1921) (finding that
"broad sweep of restraint" of preliminary injunction was erroneous because it reached "lawful union
arguments" and "lawful union speeches"); Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 159 N.E. at 869 (holding that
"broad scope" of injunction was beyond power of court because reached lawful ends undertaken for lawful
means).
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"for any reason." 94 In other words, the court held that the injunction extended
beyond equitable bounds by prohibiting activity with lawful means and
ends.95 The decree was also too broad, according to the court, because the
evidence did not indicate that the defendant "ha[d] threatened or intend[ed] to
do any of these things. 96 The court thereby based its overbreadth holding
both on analysis of means and ends and on the principle that courts of equity
should issue injunctions only against actual rather than hypothetical threats of
harm. Similarly, in the Southern California Iron & Steel Co. case, a California
court held that an injunction was "too broad in its terms, in that it purports to
prohibit acts which may or may not be unlawful, according to the purpose for
which they are done."97
Significantly, as the more liberal state courts continued to develop
overbreadth analysis, their rationale acquired new subtleties in some cases. In
International Pocket Book Workers' Union v. Orlove,98 for example, a
Maryland court observed that "in so far as the injunctions may be so broad that
their meaning and content depend upon the unpredictable views of the court
in particular applications, they may operate as mere screens for subsequent ex
post facto ... punishments." 99 The court thereby expressed concern over
arbitrary enforcement of broad injunctions, noting that the possibility of such
enforcement would make it difficult for defendants to know when their conduct
was lawful. Hence, the enjoined parties' only viable course of conduct would
be "abandonment of all picketing and other efforts; and that.., cannot be
required."'1 This concern that the possibility of arbitrary enforcement of
broad prohibitions might deter prospective exercise of picketing rights
reappeared later in the Supreme Court's free speech overbreadth
jurisprudence.'
Some courts also continued to develop the principle that injunctions could
be found to be too broad because they prohibited lawful activity even if the
defendant's own action had been unlawful. 2 The rationale some courts
developed, as stated by Judge Cardozo, was that "[a]n injunction does not issue
in such circumstances as punishment for the past. Its only legitimate end is
protection for the future."' 0 3 Since an injunction was a purely prospective
94. Grassi Contracting Co., 160 N.Y.S. at 287.
95. See id. at 286-87.
96. Id. at 287.
97. Southern Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers, 200 P. 1.
7 (Cal. 1921).
98. 148 A. 826 (Md. 1930).
99. Id. at 831.
100. Id.
101. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
102. See Note, Prior Illegal Acts as a Ground for Blanket Injunctions Against Picketing, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 971, 975 (1932) (discussing cases that refused to uphold blanket injunctions that were granted in
response to prior illegal acts).
103. Nann v. Raimist, 174 N.E. 690, 693 (N.Y. 1931).
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remedy, some liberal appellate courts held that its proper scope should be
evaluated not on the basis of past action, but rather on the basis of ongoing or
threatened future conduct.' Hence, a New York court noted that a blanket
injunction against picketing may be too "broad" despite allegations of past
unlawful acts.10 5 In this manner, the courts continued to elaborate the view
that prohibitions against picketing and persuasion could be held to be too broad
even if some of the defendant's past conduct was proscribable.
Although the Supreme Court generally viewed labor activity unfavorably
in this era, in the 1920s the Court began to apply a version of the overbreadth
analysis that had emerged in the liberal lower courts. In American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,"e6 the Court eliminated from
the injunction at issue the word "persuasion" as it applied to two of the
defendants, on the grounds that persuasion was a "lawful" form of labor
activity.'0 7 The Court expressed reservations about permitting picketing,
however, and allowed only one picket at each factory gate.' Although this
holding provided only limited protection for picketing, the Court showed signs
of embracing the emerging overbreadth approach.
D. The ACLU and the Continued Push to Codify the Traditional
Practices of Equity
The persistent tendency of lower federal courts to issue broad
injunctions,"° with only a few exceptions,"0 became one of the central
concerns of the community of civil liberties advocates in the 1920s."1
Although most courts continued to refuse to recognize picketing and labor
organizing as implicating free speech rights,"2 civil liberties activists began
to view restrictions at equity on labor's speech as significant infringements of
First Amendment liberties. In particular, labor's efforts at opposing blanket
injunctions drew the attention of Roger Baldwin, a prominent free speech
104. See, e.g., Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' Int'l Union, 193 N.E. 112, 121 (Ill. 1934) ("The mere
fact that acts of violence had been previously committed would of itself furnish no justification for
enjoining legal acts of peaceable persuasion."); J.H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 183 N.E. 509, 511 (N.Y. 1932);
Nann v. Raimist, 174 N.E. 690, 693 (N.Y. 1931).
105. J.H. & S. Theatres, 183 N.E. at 511-12.
106. 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
107. Id. at 208, 212-13.
108. Id. at 205-07.
109. See HATrAM, supra note 8, at 164.
110. See Great N. Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 415 (D.N.D. 1923); see also Gasaway v. Borderland
Coal Corp., 278 F. 56, 64-65 (7th Cir. 1921) (holding that preliminary injunction may not prohibit lawful
acts of persuasion).
I 11. See WALKER, supra note 6, at 54-55.
112. See, e.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (stating that spoken
words in furtherance of boycott exceeded individual's speech rights because they had the force of "'verbal
acts').
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activist."' In late 1919 and early 1920, Baldwin argued for reorganizing the
National Civil Liberties Bureau, a leading free speech organization, declaring
that "'the cause we now serve is labor.""' 4 At Baldwin's urging, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was founded in 1920, and one of its
principal missions was to defend labor's rights against judicial incursion."5
In late 1920, Baldwin convened a national conference on the problem of
the labor injunction, admitting that the ACLU was uncertain about how to
address the problem in light of continuing judicial hostility." 6 Felix
Frankfurter, the nation's leading expert on labor injunctions, recommended a
legislative solution and outlined a possible lobbying effort for a federal statute
to restrict the scope of injunctions." 7 The ACLU, together with the AFL,
began lobbying for this legislation in 1925 and persuaded Congress to hold
hearings two years later." 8 By 1930, Roger Baldwin took charge of the
campaign, forming the National Committee on Labor Injunctions to carry it
out."
9
The efforts of Baldwin and the ACLU paid off in 1932 when Congress
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 20 The Act was designed to place more
specific and comprehensive restrictions on the power of federal courts of
equity in labor disputes than those of the largely ineffectual Clayton Act.'
2'
In limiting the range of equitable powers, 22 Congress was especially intent
on protecting the rights of workers to give publicity to the facts of disputes,
"whether by advertising, speaking, [or] patrolling."' 23 Congress limited the
scope of injunctions by requiring that they be based on "findings of fact" and
confined to the "specific act or acts as may be expressly complained of."' 24
Furthermore, the statute restricted injunctions to acts that "will be committed
unless restrained."'12 Congress thereby drafted the statute to limit injunctions
to actual rather than hypothetical harms and to ensure that they would be clear
and precise. In this manner, the Act codified the restrictive doctrines of equity
that a minority of courts had developed and observed. As one contemporary
113. WALKER, supra note 6, at 54-55.
114. Id. at 46-47.
115. Id. at 46-47, 54-55.
116. Id. at 55.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 87.
120. Pub. L. No. 65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994)).
121. See Ernest Feidler, Comment, I I Wisc. L. REV. 552, 552-53 (1936).
122. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 104-07 (1994); see also Tanenhaus, supra note 19, at 196; Comment, 30 MICH.
L. PRv. 1257, 1257 (1932).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
124. Id. § 109.
125. Id. § 107(a).
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commentator noted, "it is safe to say that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did little
more than codify the attitude of the more liberal courts."'
2 6
In the wake of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, seventeen states adopted laws
that likewise sought to codify the restrictive equity doctrines that formed the
core of overbreadth analysis. 7 The passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
its state analogues marked a turning point in the development of the
overbreadth doctrine. Norris-LaGuardia reflected the mounting public support
for restricting the broad prohibitions that courts had placed on labor's rights
to organize and advocate. 28 This support was particularly strong in the early
1930s due to the dire economic downturn of the Great Depression. Norris-
LaGuardia and its analogues served as clear legislative endorsements of the
liberal courts that had taken an expansive view of the legitimate means and
ends of expression in labor disputes. Thus, Norris-LaGuardia was largely
effective in curbing the issuance of broad injunctions by federal courts.'
29
The state law counterparts also helped limit broad injunctions, although some
courts in jurisdictions without such statutes or with inadequate statutes
continued to abuse their equity power.
30
The legislative debates surrounding the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act evinced free speech overtones. One Representative expressed his support,
for example, for the free speech rights of members of labor unions: "If the
Constitution means anything in the matter of freedom of speech, it should be
applied just as fully to men who belong to a union .... ',,ls Thus, the Act,
which marked the triumph of the equitable principles underlying the
overbreadth doctrine, was also bound up with an emphasis on free speech that
reflected the goals of its proponents and lobbyists.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
The history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act indicates that the growing support
for traditional principles of equity in the 1930s was linked to an increasing
emphasis on freedom of speech. As labor gained political strength and public
approval during the Great Depression and New Deal, it began to win not only
congressional but also judicial recognition of its picketing and organizing
126. J. Louis Warm, A Study of the Judicial Attitude Toward Trade Unions and Labor Legislation,
23 MINN. L. REv. 255, 301-02 (1939); see Mozart G. Ratner & Norton J. Come, The Norris-LaGuardia
Act in the Constitution, 11 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 428, 432 (1943).
127. See Tanenhaus, supra note 19, at 197.
128. See WALKER, supra note 6, at 87.
129. GREGORY, supra note 6, at 104.
130. Cox, supra note 48, at 775-76; Tanenhaus, supra note 19, at 197.
131. 75 CONG. REc. 5467 (1932) (statement of Rep. Greenwood); see also id. at 4507 (statement of
Sen. Norris) (expressing concern that labor injunctions have abridged constitutional rights of workers); id.
at 4620 (statement of Sen. Blaine) (expressing concern for constitutional freedoms of workers).
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activities as exercises of free speech. 32 Thus, courts began to introduce free
speech principles into the emerging equity jurisprudence, 33 taking an
important initial step toward the constitutionalization of the overbreadth
doctrine that occurred at the end of the decade.
A. The Influence of Free Speech Principles in Labor Injunction Cases
The growing recognition of labor's speech rights among courts of equity
in the 1930s stemmed both from labor's enhanced political clout' 34 and from
its increasingly political message. 35 Throughout the decade, labor played a
central role in national politics, pressing Congress to pass such momentous
legislation as the Wagner Act 36 and the Fair Labor Standards Act.
137
Labor activism also became increasingly politicized, or politically charged, as
labor became the backbone of the New Deal coalition 38 and as some sectors
of the labor movement became more involved with radical politics.' 39 These
political overtones led some courts in labor injunction cases to reconceive of
labor's picketing and protesting as activities central to democracy rather than
vulgar instances of intimidation or economic coercion.
40
Another factor prompting some courts to consider free speech principles
in labor injunction cases was the general rise in -the prestige of free speech in
the 1930s. Support for free speech increased in the United States partly
because Nazi and Bolshevik repression in Europe stimulated sentiments in
favor of greater protection for liberty at home.' 4' In addition, the formation
of the New Deal coalition brought about greater tolerance of pluralism and
132. Geoffrey D. Berman, A New Deal for Free Speech: Free Speech and the Labor Movement in the
1930s, 80 VA. L. REV. 291, 293-94 (1994); David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITQUE 237, 237-38, 258 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
133. See, e.g., Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 41 P.2d 314, 316 (Cal. 1935); Exparte Lyons, 81 P.2d
190, 196-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938); Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper
Guild, 199 A. 598, 602-03 (N.J. 1938); John R. Thompson Co. v. Delicatessen & Cafeteria Workers Union,
Local 410, 8 A.2d 130, 133 (N.J. Ch. 1939); see also Tanenhaus, supra note 14, at 413 (noting that courts
increasingly recognized labor's free speech rights in 1930s).
134. See Kairys, supra note 132, at 258 (explaining that power of labor movement in 1930s led judges
to protect labor's free speech rights).
135. Labor's objectives became more explicitly political after the establishment in 1937 of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The CIO, which extended union organizing into the unskilled
industrial occupations, focused not simply on traditional labor objectives, but also on other issues such as
housing, education, public health, price control, and foreign policy. ARCHIBALD COX Er AL., LABOR LAW
91 (llth ed. 1991).
136. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
137. Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
138. See Berman, supra note 132, at 293-95, 297-98.
139. See SIDNEY LENS, THE LABOR WARS 286-87 (1974).
140. It is instructive to compare the view of labor organizing in a 1939 case, John R. Thompson Co.
v. Delicatessen & Cafeteria Workers Union, Local 410, 8 A.2d 130, 133 (N.J. Ch. 1939) ("When a court
of equity grants an injunction in a case of this kind... it touches rights dear to every American.") with
the view of a 1905 case, Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gee 139 F. 582, 584 (S.D. Iowa 1905) ("There is
and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing ... any more than there can be ... lawful lynching.").
141. WALKER, supra note 6, at 112.
1686
Free Speech Overbreadth
diversity in American life, as working people, Catholics, and Jews were
increasingly accepted into the American political mainstream.
142
Courts of equity increasingly recognized labor's free speech rights,
moreover, as a result of a famous dictum by Justice Brandeis in the 1937 case
of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.143 In that opinion, the Court upheld
a Wisconsin anti-injunction act that protected peaceful picketing, rejecting a
claim that the act violated the Due Process Clause. 144 Justice Brandeis noted
that "members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a
State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. 1 4 Since this was the first instance
in which the Court hinted that it considered picketing to be a form of free
speech,146 the Brandeis dictum exerted significant influence on lower
courts.
147
Despite its role in encouraging courts to apply free speech principles in
labor cases, the Senn dictum did not provide much doctrinal guidance as to the
parameters of free speech protection of labor activity. 48 In its brevity, the
Brandeis dictum left many questions unanswered. 49 In the absence of clear
guidance, courts in labor cases turned to the doctrinal structure that already
existed at equity for protecting labor's rights of picketing and persuasion,
engrafting their discussion of free speech onto the preexisting analytical
structure of equity. 5 In the process, the discussion of free speech often
strengthened the protections that had emerged at equity.
Some courts in the 1930s used the overbreadth analysis typical of equity
cases as a doctrinal framework to perform both free speech analysis and
142. Id.; Berman, supra note 132, at 293-94. Prestige for free speech also increased as the Supreme
Court handed down a series of decisions expanding political and religious liberties under the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
143. 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937).
144. See id. at 478-82.
145. Id. at 478.
146. Tanenhaus, supra note 14, at 398; John F. Cushman & H. Terhune Herrick, Jr., Note, A Re-
examination of Picketing and Free Speech, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 81, 81 (1948).
147. 3 SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY 169 (1984) (noting that more than 30 cases between Senn and
Thornhill treated peaceful picketing as form of speech); Tanenhaus, supra note 14, at 413.
148. Tanenhaus, supra note 14, at 403-04.
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 41 P.2d 314, 316 (Cal. 1935); Ex Parte Lyons, 81 P.2d
190, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938); Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild,
199 A. 598, 602-03 (NJ. 1938); John R. Thompson Co. v. Delicatessen & Cafeteria Workers Union, Local
410, 8 A.2d 130, 133 (N.J. Ch. 1939). Even cases that rejected challenges to the breadth of injunctions used
the means and ends doctrinal framework in order to assess the appropriate scope of free speech rights. See,
e.g., Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees Union, Local 830,22 N.E.2d 320, 321-22 (N.Y. 1939);
Moreland Theatres Corp. v. Portland Moving Picture Mach. Operators' Protective Union, Local 159, 12
P.2d 333, 338 (Or. 1933) ("Defendants ... contend that the constitutional guaranty of free speech...
justif[ies] their conduct .... [This is] true only when the combination is formed for a lawful purpose.");
see also Tanenhaus, supra note 14, at 408.
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inquiry into means and ends. t'5 In Lisse v. Local Union No. 3,152 for
example, the California Supreme Court invalidated a decree against picketing
and distributing leaflets for the following reasons:
[The decree is] too broad, for the reason that, not only do the
terms thereof go so far as to infringe upon the constitutional right to
freely circulate and offer said newspaper ... but [also] ... the
comprehensive terms of the injunction herein enjoin appellants from
doing some of the acts ... it may lawfully do in furtherance of a
secondary boycott.
53
The court thus invalidated an injunction as "too broad" on the dual grounds
that it violated free speech rights and reached lawful activity undertaken for
legitimate ends. The court thereby utilized the overbreadth approach from
equity as a single doctrinal umbrella for carrying out both free speech analysis
and the means and ends inquiry of equity jurisprudence.
Sometimes courts synthesized the overbreadth approach of equity with free
speech principles, moreover, by finding injunctions to be too broad in violation
of free speech rights if they did not withstand the analysis of means and ends.
For example, in Ex parte Lyons 54, a 1938 California Court of Appeal
decision, the court held that an injunction violated the free speech guarantee
because it proscribed lawful picketing activity undertaken for lawful ends. The
court explained that peaceful picketing was legitimate under the statutory and
decisional law of California, and that furtherance of a secondary boycott was
a lawful objective. Thus, the court held that "a secondary boycott peacefully
and properly conducted is legal in California under the constitutional guaranty
of the right of free speech."' 55 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited the
overbreadth analysis of Lisse v. Local Union No. 31156 and Southern
California Iron & Steel Co.,5 7 which had been central in establishing
overbreadth analysis at equity. The court found that the injunction in question,
like the decrees in the earlier cases, was "too broad" because it forbade
peaceful picketing in violation of free speech principles.
5 8
In a number of labor injunction cases of the 1930s, the courts applied
overbreadth analysis in tandem with free speech principles, allowing for
overlap and synthesis. Although the doctrinal link was not uniform in its
151. See Berman, supra note 132, at 317 (noting that in some instances scope of labor's rights and
free speech issues were "decided under a single doctrinal framework").
152. 41 P.2d 314 (Cal. 1935).
153. Id. at 316.
154. 81 P.2d 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
155. Id. at 197.
156. Id. at 195-96 (citing Lisse, 41 P.2d at 316).
157. Id. (citing Southern Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers,
200 P. 1 (Cal. 1921)).
158. Id. at 196-97.
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development, the labor injunction cases stamped overbreadth analysis with a
constitutional imprimatur that would contribute to its incorporation into First
Amendment doctrine in statutory cases.
B. The Extension of Overbreadth Analysis to Statutes Under the
First Amendment
As a result of the increasing limitations placed on labor injunctions in the
1930s, many employers sought to regulate labor activity in a different manner
by urging states and municipalities to pass regulatory ordinances or to apply
existing statutes. A pair of commentators, writing in 1938 and 1940, noted that
employers had begun to rely on municipal and state picketing statutes as
substitutes for the increasingly limited labor injunction.'59 These statutes
placed restrictions on picketing that were similar in scope to the broad
injunctions they replaced. For example, a section of the Reno, Nevada,
picketing ordinance imposed fines or imprisonment on "'whoever shall watch,
beset or picket the premises of another, or any approach thereto for the
purpose of inducing others to refrain from entering such premises.
' ' 60
According to one commentator, these statutes were often broad enough in
scope to bring about the "complete nullification" of the gains labor had made
in limiting injunctions.
t61
The role of picketing statutes as substitutes for blanket injunctions led
some state courts to rely on past labor injunction cases in invalidating local
and state picketing statutes under the First Amendment. In 1939, two state
supreme courts handed down opinions that extended the overbreadth doctrinal
approach from equity to picketing statutes under the First Amendment.' 62
These courts invalidated the ordinances under the Free Speech Clause on the
grounds that they reached too far in prohibiting even peaceful picketing with
a lawful purpose. In this manner, the courts helped to convert the overbreadth
approach that had been developed at equity into a First Amendment doctrine
in statutory cases.
The clearest example was the opinion of the Supreme Court of Nevada in
City of Reno v. Second Judicial District Court.63 In that case, the court
facially invalidated two sections of Reno's picketing ordinance on the ground
that they violated the First Amendment.' 64 The court began its opinion by
159. See Note, supra note 16, at 308-09; Kinder, supra note 16, at 110, 118.
160. See City of Reno v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 95 P.2d 994, 996 (Nev. 1939) (quoting Reno
picketing ordinance, § 2).
161. Note, supra note 16, at 309.
162. See People v. Harris, 91 P.2d 989 (Colo. 1939); City of Reno, 95 P.2d 994.
163. 95 P.2d 994 (Nev. 1939).
164. The two sections of the Reno ordinance that the court invalidated imposed a blanket ban on
picketing. See Reno, 95 P.2d at 996 (quoting § 2 of Reno picketing ordinance); id. (quoting § 4 to the
effect that, "'Whoever, in association or agreement with one or more persons, shall assemble, congregate,
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quoting at length from a series of labor injunction cases that had protected
"peaceful persuasion for the promotion of a lawful purpose."' 65 After
emphasizing this means and ends rule, the court proceeded to hold that the
sections at issue violated the First Amendment because they reached all forms
of picketing regardless of the lawfulness of means and ends:
[The sections] go beyond regulation. They are a sweeping prohibition
of any form of picketing, irrespective of its nature, purpose or number
of pickets, and constitute an interdiction of all activities and free
speech sought to be exercised in the form of peaceful picketing. The
federal constitution guarantees freedom of speech.
66
The court in the Reno case invalidated the ordinance sections as violations of
the free speech guarantee because they did not delimit the scope of the
prohibition by taking account of either the form or the purpose of the
picketing. The court thereby characterized the manner and the ends of
picketing as the touchstone for establishing the proper breadth of picketing
prohibitions under the First Amendment. The court held that the sections were
too broad because they forbade all picketing in all forms for all ends. The
court thereby used overbreadth analysis characteristic of equity as a basis for
reaching its free speech decision.
The court's analysis in Reno was analogous to the approach at equity,
moreover, because the court sought to strike a balance between protecting
freedom and allowing regulation, acknowledging that the state may "regulate"
picketing but emphasizing that it may not "prohibit" picketing altogether.' 67
Furthermore, just as courts of equity had permitted defendants who had
engaged in intimidation or unlawful conduct to challenge the breadth of
injunctions that reached peaceful persuasion, so too the court in Reno allowed
the defendants to challenge the breadth of the provisions that reached peaceful
picketing regardless of whether their own conduct was peaceful.' 6 The court
stated that, in deciding the constitutional question, "the agreed statement of
facts will be laid out of consideration" and that the validity of the provisions
would be decided "as a matter of law."'169 Thus, the court was not concerned
with the application of the statute to the facts in the instant case but rather with
the facial and prospective constitutionality of the provisions.
or meet together in the vicinity of the premises of another, or upon the streets ... for the purpose of
inducing others to refrain from entering such premises... shall ... be fined [or] imprisonfed] . .
165. Id. at 998-1000.
166. Id. at 1000.
167. Id. at 1004.
168. See id. at 997.
169. Id.
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The other major state court decision regarding a picketing statute in 1939
was the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in People v. Harris.170 Like the
Reno court, the court in Harris surveyed the law of numerous labor injunction
cases, noting that labor has the right to engage in "peaceful picketing when
done for a lawful purpose."'171 The court proceeded to invalidate the
Colorado statute as applied in the instant case on the grounds that it was an
"unqualified prohibition" and that it reached "peaceful picketing" in violation
of the free speech guarantee, quoting from past injunction cases, such as Ex
parte Lyons,172  that protected peaceful picketing under the First
Amendment. 173 Thus, the court in Harris, like the court in Reno, drew from
the analysis of means and ends characteristic of equity's overbreadth approach
in rendering its free speech decision. 7
The major innovation of Reno and Harris was their extension of the basic
framework for protecting picketing at equity to statutory cases under the First
Amendment. This was a significant step on the path to Thornhill because the
statutes in those cases were analogous to the Alabama picketing statute
invalidated in Thornhill. In fact, the court in Harris noted that "[o]nly one
other state, Alabama, has a similar law."' 75 In addition, the Reno court
discussed and distinguished an Alabama state court opinion upholding the
picketing statute that the Supreme Court would subsequently hold
unconstitutional in Thornhill.176 Thus, the decisions in Reno and Harris
provided salient precedents on picketing statutes in general, and Alabama's in
particular, when the Supreme Court heard arguments in Thornhill.
C. Thornhill v. Alabama: The "Fountainhead"1M of the Free Speech
Overbreadth Doctrine
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Thornhill in February
1940.78 The Alabama statute at issue declared it a misdemeanor for any
person "'without a just cause or legal excuse '. ' 179 to "'picket the works or
place of business of such other persons, firms, corporations, or associations of
persons, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with or injuring
170. 91 P.2d 989 (Colo. 1939).
171. Id. at 992.
172. 81 P.2d 190 (Cal. 1938).
173. Harris, 91 P.2d at 993.
174. The court in Harris did not have the opportunity to invalidate the statute on its face because the
litigants brought an "as applied" challenge.
175. 91 P.2d at 990.
176. Reno, 95 P.2d at 1002.
177. See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 11.
178. 3 FINE. supra note 147, at 170. The Thornhill case was argued on the same day as another
picketing case, Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940). 3 FINE, supra note 147, at 170.
179. Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 91 (1940) (quoting ALA. CODE § 3448 (1923)). The Court
found that this qualifying phrase "does not in any effective manner restrict the breadth of the regulation;
the words themselves have no ascertainable meaning either inherent or historical." Id. at 100.
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any lawful business.""' 180 The law had been applied to prosecute Byron
Thornhill, a union president, who had walked a picket line with six or eight
other men at the plant of the Brown Wood Preserving Company in
Brownsville, Alabama.' 8' Thornhill's offense was that he approached
Clarence Simpson, a nonunion worker entering the plant, and told him that the
union was on strike and that he should not report to work.
82
The Alabama statute, in its rhetoric and scope, was similar to blanket
injunctions that prohibited unions from "congregating, picketing ... or
otherwise interfering with the employees, business, or working organization of
the plaintiff."'8 3 The statute, like sweeping injunctions, left little room for
peaceful picketing and persuasion. The Thornhill Court thus faced a similar set
of circumstances to those that arose in the Reno and Harris cases: the
application of an expansive picketing statute that was analogous to the
picketing injunctions that had been used to stifle labor activity. The Reno case
played a particularly important role in framing the issues of Thornhill. In his
brief in Thornhill, the petitioner stated that he had decided to abbreviate his
free speech argument and simply append the Reno decision as an "exhaustive
citation[] of all relevant authority."1'84
The Court's analysis and rhetoric in Thornhill closely tracked that of the
Reno opinion in key places. The Court found that the state picketing statute
constituted a "sweeping regulation"' 85 that was invalid on the following
grounds:
The statute ... leaves room for no exceptions based upon either the
number of persons engaged in the proscribed activity, the peaceful
character of their demeanor, the nature of their dispute with an
employer, or the restrained character and the accurateness of the
terminology used in notifying the public of the facts of the
dispute.
8 6
The Court in Thornhill found the Alabama statute to be too broad because it
prohibited all picketing without regard to the "nature of [the] dispute" and the
"restrained character" of the picketing, thereby anchoring its analysis of the
proper breadth of the statute in a means and ends inquiry. Significantly, the
Court cast this overbreadth analysis explicitly in free speech terms at another
point in the opinion, finding the statute to be too broad because in reaching
peaceful picketing the statute interfered with protected speech: "[The statute]
180. Id. at 91 (quoting ALA. CODE § 3448 (1923)).
181. Id. at 93-94.
182. Id.
183. Injunction issued in Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 159 N.E. 863 (N.Y. 1928), quoted
in FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 271.
184. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Thornhill (No. 514).
185. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 96.
186. Id. at 99.
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sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances
constitute an exercise of freedom of speech .. . .""' Thus, the Court applied
an overbreadth framework analogous to that of Reno and prior equity cases in
developing its free speech approach.
The Supreme Court's use of doctrine from prior picketing cases in
Thornhill was noted by Professor Ludwig Teller in 1942.88 Teller argued
that the Thornhill Court still "recognized the traditional conception of
picketing" as an activity protected only when it possesses "legal
justification."'' 9 Hence, Teller suggested that the Court in Thornhill had
preserved the doctrine of lawful means and ends in deciding whether picketing
should be protected. He argued, however, that the link between the Court's
lawful justification analysis and its free speech doctrine was "obscure" in the
opinion. 190 Teller might have missed the connection between the Court's free
speech overbreadth doctrine and means and ends analysis because he did not
recognize that free speech overbreadth analysis had been predicated on analysis
of means and ends in the closely analogous case of Reno and in earlier equity
opinions.
Teller may also have missed the connection because the Court in Thornhill
did not cite Reno and failed to cite many prior equity cases to support its free
speech overbreadth approach. 9' In the segment of the opinion that closely
resembled the analysis of the Reno decision, the Court did not cite Reno or any
other case.' 92 This failure to cite likely stemmed from the Supreme Court's
reluctance in that era to rely on lower court opinions, a reluctance evidenced
by the fact that the Court relied exclusively on Supreme Court precedent in the
Thornhill opinion.'93 The one labor injunction case at equity that the Court
cited was its own 1921 decision in Tri-City, 94 in which it upheld parts of a
decree that were, in the words of the Thornhill Court, "narrowly drawn to
cover the precise situation."'95 Thus, the Court cited the Tri-City equity
decision for the proposition that only a narrowly drawn prohibition of picketing
could withstand free speech scrutiny.
Even though the Court in Thornhill did not cite many cases at equity to
support its analysis, the injunction cases formed the doctrinal backbone of the
Supreme Court briefs of both the petitioner and the respondent. The
respondent's brief emphasized the centrality of injunction cases, stating that the
187. Id. at 97.
188. See Ludwig Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REV. 180, 184-86 (1942).
189. Id. at 185. Teller's use of the term "justification" stems from Holmes's formulation of the theory
of 'justifiable" means and ends. See supra note 48.
190. Id.
191. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 99-101.
192. See id. at 99.
193. The Supreme Court did, of course, cite Alabama state court opinions construing the statute but
did not treat them as decisional authorities.
194. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
195. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 105.
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largest body of relevant precedents "are found in the multitudinous injunction
proceedings."'9 6 The petitioner similarly relied on a series of past equity
cases involving picketing, including the free speech and equity discussion in
Ex parte Lyons.19 7 Thus, labor injunction cases, including those that had
synthesized means and ends analysis with free speech principles, constituted
the vast majority of supporting authority in both briefs.
The respondent also specifically argued that the Alabama statute did not
violate the restrictive doctrines of equity, stating that the statute was "definitely
qualified" rather than sweeping and crystallized the "best considered opinions
of the best courts [of equity]."' 98 The respondent proceeded to canvass a
series of equity decisions that applied the analysis of "legitimate" or
"justifiable" means and ends, including cases such as Tri-City and Plant v.
Woods.'99 Significantly, the respondent linked means and ends analysis to free
speech, arguing that the free speech guarantee should not protect picketing
with unlawful means or ends and asserting that petitioner's picketing had
unlawful means and ends.200
The briefs, contemporary commentary, and the language of the opinion all
point to the direct doctrinal connection between Thornhill and prior picketing
jurisprudence at equity. An important question arises, however, as to why,
besides fidelity to precedent, the Court followed the overbreadth approach of
picketing cases at equity in Thornhill. One explanation is that the Court wanted
to protect a range of means and ends of picketing as legitimate while still
upholding the power of the state to "set the limits of permissible contest open
to industrial combatants, '2 ' which had also been a goal of prior equity
courts. The Court in Thornhill showed reluctance to declare unequivocally that
picketing was in all instances a protected exercise of free speech. The
overbreadth approach allowed the Thornhill Court, like courts of equity, to
protect a range of means and ends as legitimate while still permitting more
precise regulation of picketing tactics deemed coercive or threatening. The
overbreadth approach was different in the statutory context, however, because
a court could not rewrite a statute to protect legitimate forms of picketing as
equity courts could rewrite judicial decrees.0 2 Instead, the Court invalidated
the statute on its face,203 insisting that the legislature be responsible for
196. Brief for Respondent at 33.
197. See Brief for Petitioner at 13.
198. Brief for Respondent at 29.
199. See id. at 14-15, 42-45.
200. See id. at 61-62.
201. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 104.
202. Some commentators have argued that courts may permissibly sever unconstitutional portions of
a statute or impose narrowing constructions. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 1, at 14-23; see also STONE
Er AL., supra note 1, at 1125-26. The Court is generally reluctant to ask state courts to impose a limiting
construction. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471 (1986) ("A federal court may not properly
ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a statute.").
203. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 96-97.
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drafting a more precise prohibition of unlawful forms of picketing. Although
the Court thus shifted responsibility to the legislature for modifying broad
prohibitions to protect picketing, the practice of striking a balance between
protecting freedom and permitting regulation remained.
The Court's desire to strike this balance may have stemmed in part from
the influence of Justice Murphy, the author of Thornhill. A former Governor
of Michigan, Murphy had long been associated with the labor movement
2 4
and had urged the state legislature to pass a statute protecting picketing. Yet
he had also been willing to place some restrictions on picketing.2 5 In a note
to Justice Huddleson, Justice Murphy explained that "'our job as I see it...
is to write a reversal without serious prejudice to the police power of the state
which I believe [it] is imperative to safeguard without unduly curtailing the
right of free expression.
' ' 206
Justice Murphy's desire to strike such a balance had roots in the approach
that had long been used to regulate picketing at equity. In a memo to Justice
Huddleson, Murphy expounded, "'We don't want to end picketing.., but
what about its abuse? We want above all to preserve the freedoms but what
about using them as a cloak for activities that are properly unlawful?'
20 7
Murphy thus expressed the objective of protecting picketing under the free
speech guarantee while allowing the state to regulate picketing that was
"unlawful." Murphy's discussion of the case reflected the connections between
the "lawful justification" approach at equity and the overbreadth analysis
adopted in Thornhill.
D. Equity and the Overbreadth Standing Exception in Thornhill
The Court's adoption in Thornhill of the overbreadth approach from equity
was not confined to the use of means and ends language and the striking of a
balance between protecting freedom and allowing regulation. Another
important element, indeed a crucial element for modern free speech
doctrine,0 ' was that the Thornhill Court allowed the defendant to challenge
the potential breadth of the statute regardless of whether his own conduct was
204. Frank Murphy was renowned for his role in facilitating the success of the famous Flint Sit-Down
Strike of 1936-37, in which the United Automobile Workers Union became firmly established. According
to Sidney Fine, Murphy "delayed the enforcement of a court order that could have broken the strike" and
"sent the National Guard into Flint not to break the strike but to preserve the public peace and, in effect,
to protect the strikers from possible attack." SIDNEY FINE, SIT-DOwN: THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF
1936-1937, at 311 (1970).
205. 3 FINE, supra note 147, at 170.
206. 3 UdL at 171 (quoting letter from Frank Murphy to E.W. Huddleson, undated, in Frank Murphy's
Papers).
207. 3 id. at 172 (quoting letter from Frank Murphy to E. Huddleson (Mar. 31, 1940)).
208. See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS 78 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining that standing exception is "heart" of overbreadth doctrine).
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privileged. 20 9 The Court held that "[p]roof of an abuse of power in the
particular case" was not "a requisite for attack on the constitutionality" of a
statute that regulates free speech.10 This aspect of the Thornhill opinion has
come to be known as the overbreadth exception to the conventional
constitutional standing rule21' that a party may only seek to vindicate her
own rights.212 This overbreadth exception is one of Thornhill's most
significant innovations in free speech jurisprudence.213
By permitting a defendant to challenge a picketing statute regardless of
whether his own conduct was proscribable, the Court in Thornhill followed the
practice at equity that allowed defendants who had committed enjoinable acts
to challenge the potential breadth of an injunction against labor activity. As in
the Reno opinion, as well as earlier injunction cases, the Thornhill Court held
that the facts of the case before it should not preclude the defendant from
challenging the prohibition on picketing.214 Like some of the decisions at
equity,2 5 the Court's decision in Thornhill was based on a concern for the
prospective deterrent effect that a broad prohibition could have on the
legitimate exercise of rights. The Court explained that an overly broad statute
could be challenged even by a party whose conduct might be unprotected
because such a prohibition "results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on
all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its
purview. ' '2 16 In light of the Thornhill case's strong doctrinal links to prior
picketing cases at equity, it is likely that the Court was influenced by the
equity approach in establishing the free speech overbreadth exception to the
constitutional standing rule.
It is important to note, however, that in creating the overbreadth exception
the court cited its prior free speech decisions in the 1930s cases involving
"licensing" or "censorship." In the cases of Lovell v. Griffin,217 Hague v.
CIO,2"' and Schneider v. State,219 the Court had struck down municipal
ordinances that required licenses or permits for distributing literature or holding
public meetings. Relying on a "standardless licensing" doctrine, the Court had
209. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1940).
210. Id. at 97.
211. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 1124.
212. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973).
213. See Freund, supra note 3, at 539.
214. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97.
215. See discussion supra Sections I.B-C.
216. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 98. Although the Court has recently emphasized its concern for the effect
of overbroad prohibitions on the rights of "third parties," see City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 798 (1984), the Thornhill Court expressed concern for restraint of free discussion in general,
which presumably included prospective acts of expression by the parties before the Court as well as by
third parties. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97-98. The Thornhill Court's concern for the prospective impact
of a broad prohibition on the rights of defendants as well as of third parties mirrored the jurisprudence at
equity.
217. 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
218. 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
219. 308 U.S. 147, 162-65 (1939).
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invalidated the ordinances on their face on the ground that licensing speech
without clear standards posed an unacceptable risk of the arbitrary suppression
of free expression. 20 These decisions supported the Thornhill holding to the
extent that the Court invalidated the statutes on their face. These decisions did
not, however, indicate that a defendant whose own conduct was not privileged
could challenge such statutes. As the Supreme Court has since noted in City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,221 these licensing cases "did not involve
any departure from the general rule that a litigant only has standing to
vindicate his own constitutional rights. 222 The Court in Taxpayers for
Vincent explained that, under the licensing statutes considered in those cases,
"any enforcement carries with it the risk that the enforcement is being used
merely to suppress speech, since the statute is not aimed at a substantive evil
within the power of the government to prohibit."23 Thus, the licensing
statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the defendant's conduct as well as
in every other application because "any attempt to enforce such legislation
would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas."224 Hence, the
Court in the licensing cases invalidated the ordinances on their face under the
rationale that the statutes "could never be applied in a valid manner" because
they allowed for standardless prior licensing of speech.22
According to the Court in Taxpayers for Vincent, the statute in Thornhill
was held facially invalid, in contrast, because "the very existence of some
broadly written statutes may have such a deterrent effect on free expression
that they should be subject to challenge even by a party whose own conduct
may be unprotected. ' 26 The Court invalidated the statute on its face not
because it could never be applied in a valid manner but rather because the very
existence of the broad prohibition threatened, or in modern terms,
"chilled," 7 the legitimate exercise of free speech rights. Thus, the Court
permitted the defendant to challenge the statute on its face on the ground that
it imposed a "pervasive restraint '228 on freedom of discussion rather than on
the ground that it could never be applied constitutionally. Viewed against the
backdrop of picketing cases at equity, the Court's "pervasive restraint" concern
likely originated in the practice of the courts -of equity rather than in the
licensing cases.
Even though the Court's "pervasive restraint" analysis did not originate in
the licensing cases, the Court artfully integrated the rationale of those cases
220. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162-65; Hague, 307 U.S. at 516; Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451.
221. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
222. Id. at 796.
223. Id. at 797 n.14.
224. Id. at 797.
225. Id. at 798.
226. Id.
227. For a discussion of the "chilling effect" rationale, see Note, supra note I, at 852-58.
228. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 98.
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into the Thornhill opinion. The Court referred to the "arbitrary suppression"
rationale of the licensing cases as a reason why an overly broad statute
constituted a pervasive restraint on free speech.229 Although the Court in the
licensing cases had discussed "arbitrary enforcement" in light of the potential
for misapplication in particular cases, the Thornhill Court pointed to the
possibility of arbitrary enforcement as a justification for the notion that
overbroad statutes pose a general and continuous threat to free speech. In this
manner, Justice Murphy, writing for the Court, deftly subsumed the rationale
of the licensing cases under the rubric of his analysis, derived from equity, that
a broad prohibition acts as a constant deterrent to the prospective exercise of
speech rights. Hence, Justice Murphy was able to forge a link between the
traditional concerns of labor cases at equity and the Supreme Court's major
free speech precedents.
Justice Murphy likely situated the Thomnhill opinion in line with the
Supreme Court's major free speech precedents in order to solidify the gains
labor had made. By drawing analogies to the Court's prior free speech
opinions, Murphy sought to constitutionalize the doctrine that had emerged at
equity in order to ensure that it would be faithfully applied. Whereas equity
doctrines were discretionary in nature, the Court's pronouncements on the
Constitution were binding. In addition, Justice Murphy likely was trying to
increase the prestige of labor's rights by cloaking in constitutional splendor the
doctrinal approach that had emerged from the thorny history at equity.
Justice Murphy emphasized the significance of his Thornhill opinion by
writing "'labor's magna carta' at the top of a printed copy.230 This was the
same designation that labor supporters had optimistically bestowed on the
Clayton Act twenty-six years before. But where the Clayton Act had failed to
protect labor's right to picket and organize, Justice Murphy sought to succeed
under the First Amendment. Under the Constitution he sought to bring to
fruition labor's long battle to secure protections for picketing that had begun
with the best courts of equity and had continued through the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts, culminating in Thornhill.
Im. CONCLUSION
The history of the overbreadth doctrine is a tale of the gradual
transformation of a body of law from an oppressive force into an emancipatory
229. Id. at 97-98. Although the Court explicitly relied on the licensing cases for the arbitrary-
enforcement rationale, it is important to note that courts of equity had offered a similar rationale for holding
that injunctions were "too broad." See, e.g., International Pocket Book Workers v. Orlove, 148 A. 826, 831
(Md. 1930); see also discussion supra Section I.C.
230. 3 FINE, supra note 147, at 177.
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one.23" ' We may attribute this transformation partly to labor's persistent
political struggles and the resulting changes in social attitudes toward unions.
We may also attribute the transformation to the capacity of legal doctrines to
adapt to divergent purposes. 2 The flexibility of legal doctrines enabled
courts to use an overbreadth form of analysis that had provided modest
protection in early cases to establish significant protection for picketing in
Thornhill. The "adaptability" of legal doctrine also enabled courts to use the
traditional principles of equity to advance progressive purposes. Originally
conceived to place limits on courts' ability to provide individualized justice
according to the judicial sense of conscience, 1 3 the restrictive doctrines of
equity were eventually placed in the service of social justice according to
popular sentiment. Thus, as a result of the flexibility of legal forms, courts
were able to use the ancient doctrines of equity to forge a bold new free
speech doctrine.
231. In discussing the "transformability" of legal doctrine, I draw from the analysis of William
Forbath. See FORBATH, supra note 8, at 171.
232. See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REv. 869,
870-71 (1993) (arguing that "political valence" of legal doctrines varies in "new contexts and situations").
233. See McDOWELL, supra note 26, at 5.
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